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Abstract: I review recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether hu-
mans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from 
armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The 
work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk 
epistemology. I argue that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans 
possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More specifically, recent work shows that knowl-
edge attributions are a central part of primate social cognition, used to predict others’ behavior 
and guide decision-making. The core primate knowledge concept is that of truth detection 
(across different sensory modalities) and retention (through memory) and may also include 
rudimentary forms of indirect truth discovery through inference. In virtue of their evolutionary 
heritage, humans inherited the primate social-cognitive system and thus share this core knowl-
edge concept. 
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Some important philosophical research focuses on concepts and phenomena unfamiliar from 
everyday life. To take just a few examples, some philosophers study the properties of formal lan-
guages, the metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics, or the ultimate basis of attribute 
agreement. It is fair game for philosophers to investigate concepts and theories from nearly any 
specialized field of inquiry, including the natural and symbolic sciences. Because these special-
ized fields of inquiry investigate phenomena unfamiliar from everyday life, they inevitably in-
troduce new concepts and categories, and they often produce surprising or counterintuitive re-
sults, such as the relativity of simultaneity or quantum entanglement. These fields are not be-
holden to commonsense: that the results might be shocking is not a serious objection, even if it 
motivates people to seek objections. 
By contrast, much philosophical research aims to illuminate concepts important to us in our 
everyday lives. With respect to these concepts, philosophers have long assumed that patterns in 
ordinary usage and commonsense should constrain philosophical theorizing. The basic assump-
tion behind this approach is these patterns can be used as evidence to define or otherwise charac-
terize the relevant concepts, to illuminate the fundamental principles determining membership in 
the concept’s extension. “Ordinary-language philosophy” was an iconic twentieth-century ex-
pression of this sentiment, epitomized in the work or J.L. Austin, who wrote that “ordinary lan-
guage” should get “the first word” in philosophical theorizing (Austin 1956, p. 11). But the sen-
timent is of much older vintage. For example, John Locke claimed that a theory of knowledge 
should be informed by how we ordinarily act and talk about knowledge (Locke 1690/1975, book 
4.11.3-8). And Aristotle wrote that a philosophical theory of the good life should be evaluated “in 
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the light not only of our conclusion and our premises, but also of what is commonly said about 
it” (Aristotle 350 BCE/1941, 1098b, 9-11). 
To characterize ordinary thought and talk, many contemporary philosophers often draw on 
their own experiences, social observation, and reflections about what we would say about certain 
situations (Ducasse 1941, ch. 10; Fodor 1964; Austin 1966; Craig 1990; Jackson 1998, ch. 2). 
However, this approach is subject to at least two concerns. First, it frequently mischaracterizes 
ordinary thought and talk (Naess 1938; Colaço, Buckwalter, Stich & Machery 2014; Turri 
2016a). Second, it is almost always limited to the culture and native language of the philosopher 
in question, who frequently is also a highly privileged, highly educated male (Stich 2001; Wein-
berg, Nichols & Stich 2001; Buckwalter & Stich 2014). The solution to the first concern is 
straightforward: use more reliable empirical tools from cognitive and social science (Nichols 
2004; Murphy 2015; Buckwalter & Turri 2016). In recent years, this solution has been applied, 
with increasing effectiveness, under the label of “experimental philosophy” (for reviews, see 
Knobe, Buckwalter, Nichols, Robbins, Sarkissian & Sommers 2012; Alexander 2012; Sytsma & 
Livengood 2015). The solution to the second concern is also straightforward: study people’s 
judgments across different cultures or languages (e.g. Machery, Mallon, Nichols & Stich 2004; 
Knobe & Burra 2006). 
A recent study on knowledge judgments is an excellent example of philosophical research 
avoiding both concerns at once (Machery, Stich, Rose, Chatterjee, Karasawa, Struchiner, Sirker, 
Usui & Hashimoto 2015). The researchers’ goal was to test whether people across different cul-
tures distinguished between an agent knowing a proposition and having a justified true belief in 
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that proposition. More specifically, the researchers investigated whether, across cultures, people 
would reliably judge that having a justified true belief did not necessarily suffice to know. 
Participants from the United States, Brazil, India, and Japan were tested in their native lan-
guage. Participants read a story about an agent who gets indirect, testimonial evidence that a cer-
tain proposition is true. The proposition turns out to be true, but the agent’s evidence is oddly 
disconnected from what makes the proposition true. For example, in one scenario, Paul’s wife, 
Mary, has been missing for several hours, so he calls the local hospital to ask whether someone 
by the name of “Mary Jones” was recently admitted. The hospital worker confirms that someone 
by that name was admitted, so Paul rushes out the door. However, the patient at the local hospital 
was another woman with the same name as Paul’s wife. Nevertheless, Paul’s wife was admitted 
that evening to another hospital several miles away. After reading the story, participants rated 
whether, as Paul rushes out the door, he knows that his wife was hospitalized. Rates of knowl-
edge attribution differed significantly across cultures. For participants from the United States, 
Brazil, and Japan, the central tendency was to deny knowledge (70% to 87%). For Indian partici-
pants, the central tendency was to attribute knowledge (63%). Researchers attributed the results 
for Indian participants to a potential ambiguity whereby the Bengali word (“jáná”) used to trans-
late “know” could also mean “belief.” 
Another recent but earlier set of studies tested participants from the United States and India 
and produced different results (Turri 2013). The central tendency for United States participants 
was to deny knowledge (89%). Similarly, the central tendency for Indian participants was to 
deny knowledge (85%). (Without excluding anyone based on their answer to comprehension 
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checks, 67% of Indian participants denied knowledge.) The discrepancy between these earlier 
results from Indian participants and the later results (described above) could be explained by 
several factors. First, the two lines of research tested participants differently. The earlier set of 
studies tested all participants in English, whereas the later study (discussed above) tested partici-
pants in their native languages, including Bengali for Indian participants. Second, the two lines 
of research tested different storylines and used different response options. Third, the two lines of 
research sampled different populations in India. The population sampled in the earlier studies 
included few if any people reporting Bengali as a native language (44% reported English, 30% 
Tamil, 19% Hindi, 15% Malayalam, and 4% Marathi, with a few of these participants reporting 
native competence in multiple languages). (See Turri 2013, p. 10, n. 21). So it could be that Ben-
gali speakers specifically have different intuitions than other people, including people from other 
ethnic groups in the same region. 
Several other recent studies have investigated knowledge judgments about similar scenarios 
— that is, scenarios where an agent gets evidence for a true proposition, but the evidence is odd-
ly disconnected from what makes the proposition true (Nagel, San Juan & Mar 2013; Sayed-
sayamdost 2015; Kim & Yuan 2015). Researchers looked for intra-societal cultural variation in 
knowledge judgments. More specifically, they tested people in Western societies (United States, 
Canada, Britain) with different cultural backgrounds. None of these studies found evidence of 
intra-societal cultural variation in knowledge judgments. 
 Overall, then, the balance of evidence currently suggests that people across a variety of 
cultures and languages reliably deny that knowledge is present in such cases. This has led some 
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researchers to hypothesize that these judgments might reflect “an underlying innate and universal 
core folk epistemology” (Machery et al. 2015, p. 8). (The researchers caution that further work is 
required before accepting this hypothesis, including studies testing different scenarios, studies on 
additional cultures and languages, developmental studies, and studies collecting information on 
religion, socioeconomic status, age, and education.) The hypothesis predicts that “people in all 
cultures will possess epistemic concepts requiring more than justification, truth and belief, and in 
most cultures that concept will be expressed” by the term “commonly translated into English as 
‘know’” (Machery et al. 2015, p. 8; see also Spicer 2010). This prediction is supported by work 
in cross-cultural semantics suggesting that all human languages might contain an expression 
translatable as the English word ‘know’ (Goddard 2001). 
Some theorists have recently argued that we do not need empirical studies of the sort dis-
cussed above to conclude that there probably is a knowledge concept universal to all humans 
(Hannon 2015). The basic idea is that the concept of knowledge arises in all human societies be-
cause it “answers to some very general needs of human life and thought” (Craig 1990, p. 2). 
These needs are “severely practical” and found in even “primitive” human existence (Craig 
1990, p. 4). Humans are essentially social beings dependent on information from others to con-
sistently fulfill basic needs. This dependence creates a vulnerability to being harmed by others’ 
incompetence or duplicity. Thus humans have an interest in identifying trustworthy informants. 
The knowledge concept serves this purpose. More specifically, “The concept of knowledge is 
used to flag approved sources of information” (Craig 1990, p. 11). An approved informant is 
someone with a true belief about the topic of interest and who is highly reliable in forming true 
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beliefs (Craig 1990, pp. 12, 91; Hannon 2015, p. 773). 
If this theory is correct, then the concept of knowledge is the “outcome of certain very gen-
eral facts about the human situation” (Craig 1990, p. 10), and “we should expect every culture to 
have a word to express the concept of knowledge” (Hannon 2015, p. 772). But how shall we 
judge whether it is correct? The theory’s proponents defend it based on how well it “matches our 
everyday practice with the concept of knowledge as actually found” (Craig 1990, p. 3). They 
claim that it well explains “the intuitive extension of ‘know’ … [and] a variety of facts about the 
‘phenomenology’ of the concept” (Craig 1990, pp. 3-4). In other words, it explains important as-
pects of the way we ordinarily think and talk about knowledge — features of our “conceptual 
and linguistic institutions” (Craig 1990, p. 10). To identify these features, the theory’s proponents 
rely on their own experiences, social observation, and reflections about what we would say about 
certain situations. 
Alas, the theory’s Achilles heel is predictable. Along with so many others in the recent tra-
dition of “armchair philosophy,” the theory’s proponents have critically mischaracterized how we 
ordinarily think and talk about knowledge. Two mischaracterizations stand out. 
First, knowledge does not require belief, as those categories are ordinarily understood. Sev-
eral recent experimental studies have shown that people reliably attribute knowledge at higher 
rates than they attribute belief (Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel 2013; Murray, Sytsma & Liven-
good 2012). In some cases, the majority of people who attribute knowledge also deny belief. 
Moreover, in many perfectly ordinary contexts, people’s knowledge attributions are not based on 
belief attributions (Turri & Buckwalter 2017; Turri, Buckwalter & Rose 2016). The explanation 
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for this might be that belief ordinarily understood is connected with feeling in a way that knowl-
edge is not (Buckwalter, Rose & Turri 2015; Buckwalter & Turri in press). As William James 
wrote, “In its inner nature belief . . . is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to any-
thing else” (James 1889: 21; see also Hume 1748/1993 on belief as a feeling).
Second, knowledge does not require reliability, nor do we ordinarily assume that it does. 
Many contemporary philosophers have simply assumed without argument that knowledge re-
quires reliability. But there is good evidence that unreliably produced knowledge is not only pos-
sible but actual (Turri 2012; Turri 2015a). More importantly for present purposes, commonsense 
epistemology fully embraces the possibility of unreliably produced knowledge. In one recent se-
ries of studies (Turri 2016b), up to 90% of participants attributed knowledge in cases of unreli-
ably  produced  true  belief,  while  participants  overwhelmingly  denied  knowledge  in  closely 
matched controls. Participants consistently attributed knowledge to reliable and unreliable be-
lievers at similar rates. Participants attributed knowledge to agents whom they actively classified 
as unreliable. More generally, participants understood and processed explicit information about 
(un)reliability, but they did not seem to consult this information when making knowledge judg-
ments.
In light of these findings, I reject the armchair hypothesis about a universal human knowl-
edge concept. It is based on critical mischaracterizations of ordinary thought and talk, resulting 
in its “explaining” non-existent patterns in commonsense epistemology. To be sure, the armchair 
hypothesis describes a possible concept that could serve needs that humans actually have. But 
that  possible  concept  is  not  the  knowledge  concept  we  actually  have.  (More  precisely  and 
humbly, it is not the concept expressed by ‘know’ in contemporary anglophone societies.)
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Of course, even if that one particular armchair hypothesis is false, it does not follow that 
there is not a core universal human knowledge concept. The cross-cultural findings on knowl-
edge judgments discussed above provide some evidence for some universal features of human 
folk epistemology. Another approach to this issue is to blend some motivations from the arm-
chair project and the cross-cultural empirical project. This approach looks for needs that (i) are 
common to animal life beyond just the human species and (ii) would be well served by cultivat-
ing a knowledge concept. Similar to the armchair hypothesis, this approach begins with a thor-
oughly naturalist assumption that human behavior and institutions are “natural facts to be under-
stood as the outcome of other natural facts” (Craig 1990, p. 9). However, unlike the armchair hy-
pothesis but in keeping with the cross-cultural project, this approach relies on scientific evidence 
to validate hypotheses.
To illustrate the approach, I will baldly state a hypothesis. Then I will review some evi-
dence supporting it. Then I will discuss some of its implications.
The knowledge concept is  not a human creation (contra Craig 1990, p.  3).  Instead, the 
knowledge concept is an integral part of the primate social-cognitive system, which humans in-
herited. The core of the knowledge concept is truth detection and retention. Its origin is related to 
the basic need of predicting other organisms’ behavior to guide decision-making.
Research on primate social cognition has advanced dramatically over the past fifteen years, 
beginning with a landmark study introducing a food-competition paradigm to probe for mental-
state representations in chimpanzees (Hare, Call, Agnetta & Tomasello 2000). This paradigm was 
vastly more ecologically valid than previous studies,  which studied, for instance, how chim-
panzees decided to beg humans for food, or whether to use a human’s gaze to find hidden food 
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items. Using the more ecologically valid approach based on food competition, researchers found 
that subordinate chimpanzees kept track of which food items dominant chimpanzees currently or 
recently saw and used this information to decide which food items to retrieve (e.g. Hare, Call & 
Tomasello 2001; Kaminski, Call & Tomasello 2008).
Subsequent variations on the food-competition paradigm showed that chimpanzees actively 
conceal visual information from others, that they conceal auditory information from others, and 
that many of the same findings extend to other apes and monkey species (e.g. Flombaum & San-
tos 2005; Santos, Nissen & Ferrugia 2006; Melis, Call & Tomasello 2006; Marticorena, Ruiz, 
Mukerji, Goddu & Santos 2011; for reviews, see Call & Tomasello 2008; Seed & Tomasello 
2010; Martin & Santos 2014). (The findings pertain primarily to simian primates (apes and mon-
keys); findings for other primates are either less consistent (e.g. lemurs) or non-existent (e.g. tar-
siers). See Sandel, MacLean & Call 2011; Bray, Krupenye & Hare 2014.) Researchers have also 
found that chimpanzees attribute simple, sensible inferences to others and use this information to 
guide decision-making (Schmelz, Call & Tomasello 2011). So, in addition to truth detection and 
retention, chimpanzees also recognize in others the discovery of truth through inference.
In light of this impressive body of research, the consensus among primatologists is that 
(simian) non-human primates attribute knowledge to others and thus have a concept of knowl-
edge. This concept pertains to the detection, discovery, and retention of truths and is closely con-
nected to predicting others’ behavior and guiding decision-making. Nevertheless, primatologists 
contend that there is no clear evidence that non-human primates attribute false beliefs to others, 
from which many conclude that non-human primates lack the concept of belief. Overall, then, 
the current evidence leads many to conclude that whereas humans use belief-desire psychology, 
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non-human primates use a comparatively simpler but still  impressive “knowledge-goal” psy-
chology (e.g. Call & Tomasello 2008).
These findings on primate social cognition have at least two important implications for re-
cent philosophical research on the knowledge concept. First, contrary to the armchair hypothesis 
discussed earlier, it is a mistake to seek the knowledge concept’s origin in distinctively human 
conditions. Its origin is not human information-sharing practices or other cooperative endeavors. 
Instead,  we inherited the concept  from our primate ancestors.  This  important  fact  cannot  be 
learned from the armchair but it should inform any serious investigation seeking to understand 
human social cognition as the “outcome of natural facts” (Craig 1990, p. 9). Moreover, this fact 
might help explain why some human knowledge attributions are not based on belief attributions. 
As mentioned above, although non-human primates attribute knowledge, they lack the concept of 
belief, according to leading primatologists. If that is correct, then non-human primates obviously 
do not base knowledge attributions on belief attributions. Thus when humans do not base knowl-
edge attributions on belief attributions, it could just be a special instance of a more general fact 
about primate social cognition.
Second, the primatological findings provide strong evidence for a species-typical knowl-
edge concept in humans. This can be crystalized in a simple argument: primates share a core 
knowledge concept; humans are primates; therefore, humans share a core knowledge concept. 
Again, this core concept pertains to detecting, discovering, and retaining truths and is central to 
predicting behavior (for a defense of a theory of knowledge along these lines, including theoreti-
cal and empirical reviews, see Turri 2012; Turri 2015a; Turri 2015b; Turri 2015c; Turri 2015d; 
Turri 2016c; Turri, Friedman & Keefner 2017; Turri in press a; Turri in press b). This in turn 
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helps to settle one question motivating recent cross-cultural epistemological research, namely, 
whether there is an “innate and universal core folk epistemology” across human cultures (Mach-
ery et al. 2015, p. 8). In virtue of their primate nature, humans worldwide share this core knowl-
edge concept.
Of course, it does not follow that all humans have the exact same knowledge concept. Con-
sistent with everything I have said, there could still be important cultural or individual variation 
in how the core knowledge concept is elaborated, interpreted, or applied (compare Spicer 2010, 
p. 523 ff; Machery et al., pp. 8-9, 11). Indeed, by analogy with moral judgments, arguably we 
should expect cultural and individual differences for knowledge judgments. Our moral concepts 
and sentiments originate from more primitive instincts and mechanisms shared with primates and 
mammals more generally (Haidt 2007; de Waal 2006; Barnes, Hill, Langer, Martinez & Santos 
2008; Lakshminarayanan & Santos 2008). And despite our having a suite of species-typical ethi-
cal concepts and susceptibilities (e.g. sensitivity to others’ welfare, concern for reputation, puni-
tive  instincts),  we  nevertheless  exhibit  significant  cultural  and  individual  variation  in  moral 
judgments (for a review, see Young & Saxe 2011). The same is probably true for knowledge 
judgments.
It might be asked whether my discussion assumes that we have a reasonably clear and well-
motivated theory of concept identity enabling us to decide when two different groups share a 
concept. In response, a general theory of concept identity is not required to judge the particular 
case at hand. We know from modern biology that primates share many genetic, anatomical, so-
cial, behavioral, and psychological traits because of their common evolutionary heritage (Mitani, 
Call, Kappeler, Palombit & Silk 2012; Stanford, Allen, Antón & Lovell 2009). The human so-
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cial-cognitive system is based upon a primate social-cognitive system tens-of-millions of years in 
the making. Thus we should expect many deep and important similarities. Non-human primates 
have a concept of truth detection, discovery, and retention whose key functions appear to include 
behavioral predictions and decision-making; primatologists consider this to be a knowledge con-
cept. Humans have a concept with similar criteria and functions; cognitive scientists consider this 
to be a knowledge concept, and ordinary people use “know” to express it. In light of all this, it is 
reasonable to conclude that a knowledge concept is part of an ancient primate social-cognitive 
system. (Those who do not want to call it a “knowledge” concept can call it a “proto-knowledge” 
concept. Either way, it is still an important epistemological category in primate social cognition.)
In sum, those interested in the human knowledge concept should attend closely to evidence 
from comparative psychology and especially primate social cognition. Knowledge is a core cate-
gory of primate social cognition, which implies that humans possess a species-typical knowledge 
concept whose essence will not be fully understood by studying humans alone. 
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